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Zusammenfassung* 
Vor dem Hintergrund einer fundamental veränderten sozialpolitischen Strategie im bundes-
deutschen Alterssicherungssystem hin zu einer Stärkung privater Altersvorsorge haben die 
Prinzipien der Rentendynamisierung in Deutschland eine hohe öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit 
erlangt. In diesem Kontext präsentiert das Papier eine vergleichsweise einfache Anpas-
sungsformel mit einer eingebauten Verteilungskomponente. 
Auf der Basis der neuen Formel werden Sensitivitätsstudien in Bezug auf den Wohlstand der 
Älteren in Deutschland durchgeführt und diese Ergebnisse mit der Wohlstandslage anderer 
bundesdeutscher Altersgruppen verglichen. Die korrespondierenden Sensitivitätsanalysen 
variieren mit den Parametern der neuen Formel und sind zusätzlich auf andere Rentenan-
passungsformeln bezogen, um die divergierenden Konsequenzen der verschiedenen For-
meln und deren unterschiedliche „Philosophien“ miteinander zu vergleichen. Die genutzten 
Mikrodaten stammen aus dem deutschen Sozio-oekonomischen Panel (SOEP) 1984-2010. 
 
 
Summary* 
Amidst the backdrop of a fundamentally changed socio-political strategy within the German 
pension system towards a strengthening of private pension schemes, in Germany the princi-
ples of pension adjustments have attracted a great deal of public attention. In this context, 
the paper presents a relatively simple adjustment formula with an intrinsic distributional com-
ponent. 
On the basis of the new formula, sensitivity studies concerning the well-being of the elderly in 
Germany are performed, and these results are compared to the well-being of other German 
age groups. The corresponding sensitivity analyses vary due to the parameters of the new 
formula, and, additionally, they are related to alternative pensions’ adjustment formulas in 
order to compare the diverging consequences of several formulas and their different underly-
ing “philosophies”. The micro-data used is from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
1984-2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Dr. Jürgen Faik ist Geschäftsführer von FaMa – Neue Frankfurter Sozialforschung. Autoren-Kontakt: 
faik@fama-nfs.de. 
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1. Introduction 
In the context of pension adjustments, three issues arise: (1) the question in which way pen-
sioners should participate on macroeconomic productivity gains or, more general, on overall 
welfare developments (socio-political perspective), (2) the issue of financial sustainability of 
the pension system (fiscal perspective), and (3) the impact of pension adjustments on price 
developments and on the macroeconomic demand (macroeconomic perspective). 
This paper focuses on the first issue, i. e., on socio-political aspects. It offers a new pension 
adjustment formula and uses this formula for intergenerational distributional (sensitivity) 
analyses. 
Specifically, the paper is organized in three steps as follows. Firstly, the new adjustment for-
mula is presented. Secondly, the pension adjustments generated by this formula and by oth-
er adjustment formulas are empirically discussed for Germany. Thirdly, the impact on well-
being (income distribution) for different age groups in Germany is considered (referring to the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) as the micro-database).1 
 
 
2. Adjustment formulas 
2.1 Rules 
On principle, an adjustment formula is challenged by the following criteria: 
1. It must be affordable. 
2. It should guarantee a tight relationship between contributions and payments (in a pay-as-
you-go system). 
3. It should produce comprehensible intra- and intergenerational distributional results. 
4. For reasons of acceptance concerning the pension system, it should ensure a living 
standard above public assistance for longtime assured people. 
The latter is compatible with securing individual living standards mainly by the statutory pen-
sion system, as a main target of this system. Moreover, discretionary interventions should be 
avoided since they may cause irregularities with respect to the rules of the pension system 
and, hence, may also put the pension system’s acceptance at risk. In the past, in Germany 
there have been many of such discretionary interventions which overruled the formally valid 
adjustment formulas. For instance, in 2006 a zero adjustment of pensions was performed by 
politics, and in 2000 the pensions were adjusted by the inflation rate of the previous year – in 
both cases independent of the formal adjustment rules (in 2000: adjustment by net wages, in 
2006: adjustment by the current adjustment formula). 
Principally, pensions can be adjusted by different variables, e. g., by inflation rates, by gross 
wages, or by net wages. Furthermore, a pensions’ adjustment formula may comprise redis-
tributive elements (explicitly considering different income levels of the pensioners), etc. Since 
2005, in Germany a formula on the basis of modified gross wages and of a factor reflecting 
sustainability has been installed. In this context, particularly two points of criticism exist: First-
ly, the taking into account of non-obligatory contributions to private pensions’ schemes ap-
pears problematic, and, secondly, the weighting of the quotient of the change of the pension-
ers’ number to that of contributors by an (obscure) factor α is more or less arbitrary. 
 
                                                            
1 As a reference for the SOEP database, see, e. g., Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007. 
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2.2 A new adjustment formula 
Because of such drawbacks I argue in favour of a gross-wage based adjustment rule which 
should be modified by another (demographic and labour market’s) “sustainability factor” and 
by a “distributional factor”. This new formula is named as “integrated gross-wage adjustment” 
(abbreviated: IGWA). In my eyes it is much more plausible than the existing formula.2 
In detail, the three formula’s elements are constructed as follows: 
(1) Gross-wages’ component: It takes into account that in the German pay-as-you-go system 
the contributions result from payments out of the gross wages. Additionally, the reference on 
gross wages may avoid politically non-intended redistributions to the (relative) disadvantage 
of the target groups which may otherwise occur (i. e., if adjustments refer to net incomes and 
if, e. g., child allowances increase from which non-target groups like the elderly would also 
benefit via pension adjustments). Since an adjustment formula should, principally, unfold 
countercyclical effects (reflecting the role of social insurance systems as “automatic stabilis-
ers”), in the formula, proposed here, a lagged gross-wage adjustment is integrated (opera-
tionalized as the geometric mean of gross-wage changes from period t-3 to period t-1). 
(2) Stability component: It reflects the relation between pensioners and contributors in terms 
of their change over time. Insofar it represents demographic as well as labour market’s ef-
fects on pension payments. For a pay-as-a-you-go system it is constitutive that there is a 
kind of balance between both groups of persons mentioned. 
(3) Distributional component: It results from acquirement (4) sketched in Section 2.1: For a 
somewhat “representative” pensioner the level of his/her pension should amount to a speci-
fied percentage share of the average net (labour) income at a given point of time. In the fol-
lowing, 64 percent are supposed since such a level reflects a pension’s amount that is (suffi-
ciently) above the level of the German social assistance allowances. 
On balance, the new formula looks as follows: 
(1) 
,tx
1tZ
1tR
2tZ
2tR5.0







 

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
3-tL
1-tL
1t
ARW
t
ARW  
where: 
9.045*tARW
12
)n(
ph,tL64.0


tx  
and: 
xt  1.00 
[with: t = annual index, ARW = pension’s base value, ARW* = pension’s base value without 
considering the distributional element x, L = average gross wage p. a., R = number of pen-
sioners, Z = number of contributors, x = distributional component, L(n)ph = average per-head 
net wage p. a.]. 
                                                            
2 This formula has been developed by Faik and Köhler-Rama 2009a und 2009b. The considerations in 
Chapter 2 greatly refer to these sources. 
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For purposes of reducing complexity, in Formula (1) – concretely: concerning the equation of 
xt – it is assumed that all pensioners have to pay ten percent out of their pension to the public 
health system and that they do not have to pay any tax. Since an interplay between ARWt (or 
ARWt*) and xt exists, ARWt* at first must be calculated via a value of xt in the amount of 1.00 
(i. e., ARWt* results from the product of ARWt-1 and of the gross-wages’ and stability compo-
nents), and then, on this basis, for ARWt* a new value for xt can be computed which deter-
mines the final pension’s base value in year t (ARWt). If the relative pension’s level3 falls 
short compared to the mentioned target value of 64 percent, xt is greater than 1.00, and it is 
numerically fully considered in Equation (1). In the opposite case, if xt amounts to a value 
less than 1.00, xt is set to the value of 1.00.  
 
 
3. Empirical adjustments for Germany 
3.1 Preliminary remarks 
In a pay-as-you-go system, like the German statutory pension system, expenditures (for 
pensions and other expenditures, e. g., for rehabilitation or for administrative purposes) and 
revenues (through contributions or through government subsidies) must be on balance by 
construction. If expenditures increase (decrease), revenues must also rise (decline; and the 
other way around). Thus, the contribution rate to the German statutory pension system re-
sults from this fundamental relationship:4 
(2)        tRtQtß1:tB:andtZtLt1:tY:withtBtRtQtYtZtL  tbtb   
tß1
t1
tL
tQ
tZ
tR




tb  
[with: t = annual index, b = contribution rate, L = average gross wage, Z = number of contrib-
utors, Y = other revenues than contributions – especially governmental subsidies –, γ = pro-
portionality factor for other revenues, Q = average pension, R = number of pensioners, B = 
other expenditures than pension payments, ß = proportionality factor for other expenditures]. 
According to Equation (2), the contribution rate is determined by the product of the ratio be-
tween pensioners and contributors as well as of the relative pension’s level (and of a ratio 
indirectly representing the relation between proportionality factors for other revenues and 
other expenditures). Thus, growing pension payments (e. g., caused by higher adjustment 
rates) generate, ceteris paribus, higher contribution rates (et vice versa). 
Figure 1 illustrates the empirical development of the main elements of Formula (2) for Ger-
many 1991-2010 (also depicting – increasing – functions for the presented curves’ trends). 
Expectedly, the trends for the total revenues and for the total expenditures within the German 
statutory pension system have been very close together over time. The gap between the 
curves for pension expenditures and for contributions is – according to Equation (2) – elimi-
nated through a positive difference between Y (other revenues) and B (other expenditures). 
                                                            
3 This relative pension’s level is defined as the relation between the (net) pension payment to a “repre-
sentative” pensioner (an average earner with 45 contribution periods) and the average net labour in-
come level. 
4 For reasons of simplicity, in Equation (2) it is assumed that other revenues and other expenditures 
may be characterized by proportionality factors concerning total revenues and concerning total ex-
penditures. 
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Figure 1: Revenues and expenditures of the German statutory pension system 1991-2010 
               (Germany as a whole) 
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Source: DRV 2012, pp. 228-229 
 
3.2 Different methods of adjustment 
Figure 2 depicts – for (western) Germany 1983-20105 – the empirically calculated adjustment 
rates. In this context, in 13 years the actual adjustments are less, and also in 13 years they 
are greater than the rates generated by (fictive) adjustments on the basis of the inflation 
rates of the previous year; in one year (2000) the values of the adjustments have had the 
same amount since in 2000 pensions have been singularly adjusted by the inflation rate of 
1999. However, at the end of the observation period – 2003-2010 – the actual adjustments 
are less than the inflation-based adjustments so that since 2003 pensioners would have prof-
ited by the latter kind of adjustment. This was the ultimate outcome of considerable wage 
moderation on the part of the German work force during the first decade of the 21st century.6 
Moreover, Figure 2 reveals the (fictive) adjustment rates generated by the IGWA formula. In 
this context, two cases are differentiated from each other: the so-called static case and the 
so-called dynamic case. While in the static case it is assumed that the adjustment rates do 
not alter the general macroeconomic framework, the opposite is presumably valid in the dy-
namic case. In this latter model variant, the pension adjustment’s level in period t influences 
the contribution rate in the same period which in turn acts on the level of unemployment in 
                                                            
5 This period of time is chosen for reasons of consistency with the micro-database used in this paper, 
the SOEP, which has been conducted since 1984 in annual intervals where the annual income values 
refer to the previous year, respectively. 
6 See in this context, e. g., Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwick-
lung 2010, pp. 104-107. 
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the subsequent period t+1. Ultimately, this affects the level of wages in period t+1 – via a 
change of the national income which depends on the number of the unemployed –, and this 
is of importance concerning the adjustment rate in t+1 (see Equation (1)). Then the causal 
chain adjustment rate (t+1)  contribution rate (t+1)  level of unemployment (t+2)  level 
of wages (t+2)  adjustment rate (t+2)  … further on works. This mechanism reveals a 
kind of self-regulation in the sense that a higher (lower) adjustment rate leads to a higher 
(lower) contribution rate and subsequently – caused by a higher (lower) level of unemploy-
ment and by a lower (higher) level of wages – generates a lower (higher) adjustment rate 
and a lower (higher) contribution rate in the next round.7 
It can be seen by Figure 2 – comparing the actual adjustments with the static IGWA values – 
that in 11 years the static IGWA values are higher than the actual adjustments but that in the 
remaining 16 years the opposite is the case. With respect to the comparison between actual 
and dynamic IGWA values, the balance more clearly inclines on the side of actual adjust-
ments because now in 18 out of 27 years these adjustments are higher than in the dynamic 
IGWA case. 
In this context, in principle, it makes sense to separate two periods of time: 1983-1991 and 
1992-2010 because during these periods two fundamentally different official adjustment for-
mulas were at work: from 1983 to 1991 adjustments by changes of gross wages and from 
1992 on some variants of adjustments by changes of net wages (or “modified gross wag-
es”).8 However, it should be kept in mind, as already mentioned, that the corresponding for-
mulas were not continuously applied. Despite this restriction, a crude methodical comparison 
between the different adjustment rules appears of interest. 
The empirical results make clear that during the first period of time (1983-1991) the actual 
adjustments have been, on average, by 0.74 % and during the second period of time (1992-
2010) by 0.48 % higher than the (fictive) adjustments by IGWA (static). With respect to the 
adjustments by IGWA (dynamic), between 1983 and 1991 practically no difference emerged 
compared to the actual adjustments (the latter have been 0.01 % less), and between 1992 
and 2010 the actual adjustments had, averagely, a higher value (+0.83 %). For the entire 
period 1983-2010, the mean percentage deviation between actual adjustments and both 
IGWA rules was positive and amounted, in both cases, to +0.56 %. These (small) discrepan-
cies emerge, amongst others, from differences concerning the underlying time-lags, the in-
troduction or operationalization of demographic factors, etc. 
Table 1 summarizes the different (geometric) mean adjustment rates generated by the sev-
eral methods. 
 
Table 1: (Geometric) Mean adjustment rates of different methods in (western) Germany 
              1983-2010 (in %; 1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2010: Germany as a whole) 
Adjustment rule 1983-1991 1992-2010 1983-2010 
Actual adjustments +3.6 +1.3 +2.1 
Inflation-based adjustments +2.2 +1.9 +2.0 
IGWA (static) +2.9 +0.9 +1.5 
IGWA (dynamic) +3.6 +0.5 +1.5 
Source: Present author’s own calculations (partly on the basis of DRV 2012, Chapters 11-12) 
                                                            
7 The empirical estimates for the dynamic case are stated in Appendix 1 where more technical hints 
are given. 
8 See, e. g., Faik and Köhler-Rama 2009a, p. 603. 
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Comparing the static and the dynamic IGWA case with each other, one can detect on the 
basis of Figure 2 that both curves are, more or less, parallel to each other.9 
 
Figure 2: Pension adjustments due to different bases in (western) Germany 1983-2010 
               (1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2010: Germany as a whole) 
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3.3 IGWA elements 
Figure 3 reveals the development of the three IGWA elements over time (exemplarily for the 
static case10). It becomes evident that the distributional component xt is inoperative during 
the observation period from 1983 to 2010, and for the first time it becomes effective within 
the forecast period in the year 2019.11 Another striking pattern of Figure 3 is that the ampli-
tudes of the general adjustments by IGWA are mainly influenced by the stability factor (par-
ticularly visible in the years 1993 and 2000 during the observation period and in the years 
2014-2016 during the forecast period). 
                                                            
9 This comparison of both IGWA versions only comprises the period 1984-2010 since in the starting 
year 1983 both adjustment models have led to the same amount of adjustment which is due to the 
technical design of both models. By the way, Figure 2 and some of the further figures are truncated on 
the ordinate, for purposes of clarity. 
10 The dynamic case can be cancelled here since its patterns (and structures) concerning the three 
elements are qualitatively very similar to the corresponding patterns (and structures) in the context of 
the static case (see Table A.1 in Appendix 1). 
11 By the way, for the forecasts, data of the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is 
used (see BMAS 2011; see also Appendix 2 for more details). 
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Figure 3: Development of the IGWA elements in (western) Germany 1983-2022 (static case; 
               1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2010: Germany as a whole) 
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3.4 Consequences on contribution rates 
As was sketched in Section 3.1, higher (lower) expenditures lead to higher (lower) contribu-
tion rates. Hence, higher (lower) pension adjustments – increasing the expenditures of the 
pension system – generate aligned changes of the contribution rates. 
In this sense, Figure 4 shows the corresponding (fictive) consequences on the contribution 
rates of different adjustment rules: adjustments by inflation rates, by IGWA (static) and by 
IGWA (dynamic). Each of these rules is compared with the real consequences on the contri-
bution rates of the actual pension adjustments in Germany 1983-2010. 
Figure 4 reflects that in the years with higher (lower) adjustment rates the contribution rates 
are higher (lower) in the cases of inflation-based and adjustments by IGWA compared to the 
actual adjustments. These outcomes simply follow from the equilibrium condition stated in 
Equation (2). In the case of IGWA (dynamic), additionally, the time-lagged impacts of the 
adjustments on the contribution rates must be considered. However, this latter mechanism 
does not change the qualitative results obtained by the static IGWA case. 
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Figure 4: Effects on contribution rates of different kinds of adjustments  
               for (western) Germany 1983-2010 (1983-1990: western Germany, 
               1991-2010: Germany as a whole) 
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4. Empirical redistributive findings for Germany 
4.1 Preliminary remarks 
The adjustment of pensions reflects the redistribution of economic resources between the 
elderly and the younger people in a society. The higher the adjustments are, the higher the 
amount of redistribution in favour of the elderly is (ceteris paribus). This is because of a direct 
effect of rising pensions (increasing the relative well-being position of the elderly) and be-
cause of an indirect influence caused by growing contribution rates (reducing the relative 
well-being position of the younger people). In the dynamic IGWA case rising adjustment 
rates also lead to a higher amount of unemployment and to lower gross wages so that in this 
variant the relative well-being positions of the young people still further decline via these ad-
ditional effects. Contrary causalities hold in the case of decreasing adjustment rates. 
In the following, the welfare levels of three generations (up to 29 years, 30-59 years, 60 
years and older) are analyzed by the arithmetic mean values of these groups concerning 
equivalent household net incomes. The group-specific mean values are divided by the over-
all means which defines the relative well-being positions of the several age classes. As an 
equivalence scale, the modified OECD scale12 is used. All equivalent household net incomes 
are weighted by the corresponding number of household members. Furthermore, the defini-
tion of household income includes imputed rents, and as an income variable annual income 
                                                            
12 The modified OECD scale is as follows: first household’s person: 1.0, further household members 
aged 15 years and over: 0.5, and further household members until the age of 15 years: 0.3 (see 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/52/35411111.pdf, access at 2012-04-17).  
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of the previous year is used. Therefore, the observation period on the basis of SOEP data is 
1983-2009. Additionally, forecasts are presented in the following; they correspond to the 
(forecast) period of time from 2010 to 2025. 
 
4.2 Observation period 1983-2009 
4.2.1 Actual versus inflation adjustment 
Figures 5a-5c compare the consequences on the group-specific well-being positions of the 
actual adjustments versus the (fictive) adjustments by the inflation rates of the previous year 
with each other. Expectedly, the variant with higher pension adjustments and corresponding 
higher contribution rates produces higher relative well-being positions of the elderly (60 years 
and older) and lower positions of the younger people (up to 29 years and 30-59 years), at 
least by tendency. However, on average the percentage differences between both kinds of 
adjustment are very small for the period 1983-2009 (in the following the case of actual ad-
justments is mentioned first): up to 29 years: 89.09 % versus 89.10 %, 30-59 years: both 
108.49 %, and 60 years and older: 99.08 % versus 99.02 %.  
For both variants, a clear-cut negative tendency becomes obvious for the persons aged up to 
29 years; the opposite shows up for the elderly (at least since 1993), and for the persons 
aged between 30 and 59 years a polynomial tendency occurs. 
Figure 5a: Well-being positions (up to 29 years): Actual adjustments versus (fictive) 
                 adjustments by the inflation rates of the previous year  
                 for (western) Germany 1983-2009 SOEP (1983-1990: western Germany, 
                 1991-2009: Germany as a whole) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
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Figure 5b: Well-being positions (30-59 years): Actual adjustments versus (fictive) 
                 adjustments by the inflation rates of the previous year  
                 for (western) Germany 1983-2009 SOEP (1983-1990: western Germany, 
                 1991-2009: Germany as a whole) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
Figure 5c: Well-being positions (60 years and older): Actual adjustments versus (fictive) 
                 adjustments by the inflation rates of the previous year  
                 for (western) Germany 1983-2009 SOEP (1983-1990: western Germany, 
                 1991-2009: Germany as a whole) 
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15 
 
4.2.2 Actual adjustment versus IGWA 
Figures 6a-6c show the consequences on the group-specific well-being positions of the actu-
al adjustments versus IGWA (static). On average, the comparison between both variants of 
adjustment reveals slightly higher relative well-being positions for the younger age groups up 
to 29 years (89.18 % versus 89.09 %) and 30-59 years (108.60 % versus 108.49 %), and 
marginally lower relative well-being positions for the elderly aged 60 years and older 
(98.71 % versus 99.08 %) in the case of IGWA (static) compared to the actual adjustments. 
Figure 6a: Well-being positions (up to 29 years): Actual adjustments versus (fictive) 
                 IGWA (static) for (western) Germany 1983-209 SOEP 
                 (1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2009: Germany as a whole) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
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Figure 6b: Well-being positions (30-59 years): Actual adjustments versus (fictive) 
                 IGWA (static) for (western) Germany 1983-2009 SOEP 
                 (1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2009: Germany as a whole) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
Figure 6c: Well-being positions (60 years and older): Actual adjustments versus (fictive) 
                 IGWA (static) for (western) Germany 1983-2009 SOEP 
                 (1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2009: Germany as a whole) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
17 
 
4.2.3 Static versus dynamic IGWA 
Figures 7a-7c compare the distributional implications of both IGWA variants for the three age 
groups differentiated from each other in this paper. It becomes obvious that, on average, the 
relative well-being positions of the young people aged until 29 years (89.29 % versus 
89.18 %) and 30-59 years (108.73 % versus 108.60 %) are slightly higher in the dynamic 
case and, therefore, still higher than in the case with actual adjustments. The opposite holds 
for the elderly (98.37 % versus 98.71 % versus 99.08 %). 
That means that the dynamic model’s mechanisms sketched above averagely lead to a 
greater redistribution in favour of the young people compared to the static case (and to the 
case with actual adjustments). Hence, especially from the beginning of the 1990s on, the 
lower adjustment rates in the dynamic case than in the static variant generate, on average, 
marginally higher relative well-being relations of the young persons in IGWA (dynamic), re-
sulting from lower unemployment levels and higher (gross) wages. 
Compared with that, since 1990 only in 1991, in 1994, in 1995, in 2001, in 2004, and in 2007 
– i. e., in six out of 20 cases – the relative income position of the elderly has been higher in 
the IGWA (dynamic) variant than in the IGWA (static) variant. Thereby, in 1991, in 1994, and 
in 2001 there have been clear-cut effects of model’s dynamics on pension adjustment rates, 
contribution rates, unemployment levels, and gross wages which point to higher relative well-
being levels of the elderly in IGWA (dynamic) than in IGWA (static). In 1995 and in 2007 the 
relatively high relative well-being position of the elderly in IGWA (dynamic) compared to  
IGWA (static) was caused by stronger relative disadvantages of the young people concern-
ing unemployment and gross-wage levels in relation to their relative advantages with respect 
to pension adjustment rates and contribution rates’ changes. Ultimately, the opposite holds 
for the relative better-off of the elderly in 2004 since in that year the relative advantages of 
the elderly concerning pension adjustment rates and with respect to contribution rates’ 
changes have overcompensated the negative systemic impacts for the elderly on unem-
ployment and wage levels.13 
Figure 7a: Well-being positions (up to 29 years): IGWA (static) versus 
                 IGWA (dynamic) for (western) Germany 1983-2009 SOEP 
                 (1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2009: Germany as a whole) 
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13 See Table A.2 in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 7b: Well-being positions (30-59 years): IGWA (static) versus 
                 IGWA (dynamic) for (western) Germany 1983-2009 SOEP 
                 (1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2009: Germany as a whole) 
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Figure 7c: Well-being positions (60 years and older): IGWA (static) versus 
                 IGWA (dynamic) for (western) Germany 1983-2009 SOEP 
                 (1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2009: Germany as a whole) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
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4.3 Forecast period 2010-2025 
In Figure 8 a forecast model, sketched in Appendix 2 (Tables A.3-A.6), is applied. As one 
result, decreasing tendencies concerning well-being positions emerge for persons aged from 
30 years upwards while the opposite is the case for the youngest group (until 29 years). 
However, some differences exist between “actual” adjustments and IGWA.14 Within nearly all 
segments of the forecast period the relative well-being positions of the elderly would be high-
er in the IGWA than in the reference case, especially from 2019 on when the distributional 
IGWA factor (xt) will be at work. The latter underlines the importance of a distributional com-
ponent within a pensions’ adjustment formula since this secures the living standard of the 
elderly to a higher degree than it would be otherwise the case (in an “ageing” society which 
uses a pay-as-you-go system). Consistent with that, between 2019 and 2025 a mean ad-
justment rate in the amount of +2.9 % is estimated for IGWA as opposed to +2.0 % in the 
case of “actual” adjustments (for the entire forecast period 2010-2025 the mean values are 
+1.1 % – “actual” adjustments – versus +2.0 % – IGWA –). 
Figure 8: Well-being positions (three age classes): “Actual” adjustments versus 
               IGWA for (western) Germany 1983-2025 based on 1983-2009 SOEP data 
               (1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2025: Germany as a whole) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations (on the basis of the values stated in Appendix 2) 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The paper has shown the distributional consequences of different pension adjustment proce-
dures. Concerning the new IGWA formula it became evident that in the past no distributional 
corrections by the IGWA factor xt would have been necessary, but for the future such correc-
tions appear – in a socio-political perspective – helpful. The (fictive) implementation of the 
IGWA formula for 1983-2009 SOEP would have caused only small intergenerational well-
being effects in Germany: small well-being gains for the young people and small well-being 
losses for the elderly. For the future, welfare losses of the older age groups are expected but 
applying the IGWA formula would damp those losses. 
                                                            
14 The IGWA values belong to IGWA (static). 
20 
 
Appendix 1: A dynamic IGWA model 
 
Scheme A.1: Estimates and other equations in the dynamic IGWA case: 
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[with: t = annual index, b = contribution rate, L = average gross wage, L(n) = sum of net wag-
es, Z = number of contributors, Y = other revenues than contributions – especially govern-
mental transfers –, γ = proportionality factor for other revenues, Q = average pension, R = 
number of pensioners, B = other expenditures than pension payments, ß = proportionality 
factor for other expenditures, U = number of unemployed people, ET = employed people, EP 
= sum out of unemployed and employed persons, NI = national income, NI(2) = national in-
come estimated by fictive numbers of employed people, ARW = pension’s base value, ARW* 
= pension’s base value without considering the distributional element x, x = distributional 
component; ^ indicates an estimation variable, *** = statistically significant at the 1-percent 
level]. 
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Table A.1: IGWA elements in western Germany 1983-2010 (dynamic versus static case; 
                 1983-1990: western Germany, 1991-2010: Germany as a whole) 
Year
Gross‐wage
 component
Stability
component
Distributional
factor x
Entire
adjustment
Gross‐wage
component
Stability
component
Distributional
factor x
Entire
adjustment
1983 1.042 0.998 1.000 1.040 1.042 0.998 1.000 1.040
1984 1.046 0.966 1.000 1.010 1.032 0.966 1.000 0.996
1985 1.049 0.973 1.000 1.021 1.027 0.973 1.000 0.999
1986 1.039 1.029 1.000 1.070 1.026 1.029 1.000 1.056
1987 1.034 1.016 1.000 1.050 1.030 1.016 1.000 1.046
1988 1.019 1.011 1.000 1.030 1.032 1.011 1.000 1.043
1989 1.030 0.991 1.000 1.021 1.029 0.991 1.000 1.020
1990 1.046 0.995 1.000 1.041 1.028 0.995 1.000 1.023
1991 1.047 0.998 1.000 1.045 1.038 0.998 1.000 1.036
1992 0.977 0.985 1.000 0.963 1.008 0.985 1.000 0.993
1993 1.000 1.063 1.000 1.063 1.032 1.063 1.000 1.097
1994 1.086 0.980 1.000 1.065 1.069 0.980 1.000 1.048
1995 1.024 0.958 1.000 0.981 1.028 0.958 1.000 0.985
1996 1.005 0.954 1.000 0.959 1.023 0.954 1.000 0.976
1997 1.030 0.975 1.000 1.005 1.022 0.975 1.000 0.997
1998 1.020 0.969 1.000 0.988 1.007 0.969 1.000 0.975
1999 1.004 0.961 1.000 0.965 1.004 0.961 1.000 0.965
2000 1.010 1.069 1.000 1.079 1.013 1.069 1.000 1.082
2001 1.024 0.982 1.000 1.006 1.016 0.982 1.000 0.997
2002 0.997 0.980 1.000 0.977 1.016 0.980 1.000 0.996
2003 1.002 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.015 1.000 1.000 1.015
2004 1.028 0.971 1.000 0.998 1.011 0.971 1.000 0.982
2005 1.006 0.994 1.000 0.999 1.006 0.994 1.000 1.000
2006 0.995 1.025 1.000 1.020 1.001 1.025 1.000 1.026
2007 1.003 1.004 1.000 1.006 1.004 1.004 1.000 1.008
2008 1.009 0.994 1.000 1.003 1.013 0.994 1.000 1.007
2009 1.020 0.998 1.000 1.018 1.020 0.998 1.000 1.018
2010 1.015 0.998 1.000 1.013 1.011 0.998 1.000 1.010
Dynamic case Static case
 
Source: Present author’s own calculations 
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Table A.2: Relations and differences between IGWA cases (dynamic and static) and the 
                 case with actual adjustments in western Germany 1983-2010 
                 (dynamic versus static case; 1983-1990: western Germany, 
                 1991-2010: Germany as a whole) 
Year
Pensions' 
ratio
Contributions' 
difference
Unemploy‐
ment's ratio
Gross‐wages'
ratio
Pensions' 
ratio
Contributions' 
difference
1983 0.985 ‐0.0031 1.0000 1.0000 0.9849 ‐0.0031
1984 0.977 ‐0.0047 0.9213 1.0154 0.9637 ‐0.0075
1985 0.991 ‐0.0018 0.8850 1.0225 0.9700 ‐0.0062
1986 1.040 0.0081 0.9518 1.0088 1.0264 0.0054
1987 1.012 0.0024 1.2433 0.9560 1.0077 0.0016
1988 1.000 0.0000 1.0747 0.9866 1.0127 0.0026
1989 0.991 ‐0.0019 0.9995 1.0001 0.9907 ‐0.0019
1990 1.010 0.0020 0.9451 1.0076 0.9923 ‐0.0016
1991 0.998 ‐0.0004 1.0732 0.9933 0.9893 ‐0.0021
1992 0.936 ‐0.0126 0.9794 1.0023 0.9656 ‐0.0068
1993 1.019 0.0038 0.4486 1.0752 1.0514 0.0105
1994 1.030 0.0066 1.1225 0.9819 1.0137 0.0030
1995 0.977 ‐0.0051 1.1503 0.9786 0.9802 ‐0.0043
1996 0.950 ‐0.0111 0.8822 1.0184 0.9672 ‐0.0073
1997 0.988 ‐0.0027 0.7637 1.0411 0.9810 ‐0.0044
1998 0.984 ‐0.0038 0.9484 1.0084 0.9712 ‐0.0066
1999 0.952 ‐0.0106 0.9163 1.0124 0.9526 ‐0.0105
2000 1.072 0.0161 0.7179 1.0388 1.0755 0.0168
2001 0.987 ‐0.0030 1.3967 0.9481 0.9787 ‐0.0048
2002 0.956 ‐0.0104 0.9279 1.0105 0.9745 ‐0.0061
2003 0.991 ‐0.0020 0.7930 1.0341 1.0042 0.0010
2004 0.998 ‐0.0004 0.9571 1.0074 0.9819 ‐0.0044
2005 0.999 ‐0.0001 0.9916 1.0016 1.0000 0.0000
2006 1.020 0.0047 0.9972 1.0005 1.0261 0.0061
2007 1.001 0.0002 1.1095 0.9841 1.0022 0.0005
2008 0.992 ‐0.0018 1.0041 0.9995 0.9957 ‐0.0010
2009 0.994 ‐0.0015 0.9643 1.0046 0.9940 ‐0.0015
2010 1.013 0.0032 0.9692 1.0035 1.0096 0.0023
Dynamic case Static case
 
Source: Present author’s own calculations 
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Appendix 2: A forecast model concerning IGWA and relative well-being positions 
                      in Germany until 2025 
Table A.3: IGWA forecasts for Germany 2011-2025 
Year
(1)
Work force
(in 1,000)
(2)
Gross 
wages
(in 109 €)
(3)
L
(in 109 €)
(4)
L(n) 
(per month 
& per 
employee; 
in €)
(5)
IGWA gross‐
wage factor
(6) 
Relation 
pensioners / 
insured 
persons
(7)
IGWA 
"pensioners 
factor"
(8) 
IGWA 
without x
(9)
ARW*
(per month;
in €)
(10) 
x
(11)
x, 
normalized
(12)
ARW
(per month;
in €)
(13)
Final IGWA 
(including 
x)
2011 40,375 1,300 1,051 1,410 1.0113 0.7100 0.9997 1.0110 23.72 0.9170 1.0000 23.72 1.0110
2012 38,842 1,281 1,035 1,444 1.0264 0.7402 1.0000 1.0264 24.34 0.9152 1.0000 24.34 1.0264
2013 37,534 1,268 1,025 1,480 1.0265 0.7684 0.9593 0.9847 23.97 0.9517 1.0000 23.97 0.9847
2014 38,227 1,324 1,070 1,517 1.0245 0.7579 0.9633 0.9869 23.66 0.9884 1.0000 23.66 0.9869
2015 38,137 1,354 1,095 1,555 1.0250 0.7639 1.0138 1.0392 24.58 0.9750 1.0000 24.58 1.0392
2016 38,121 1,387 1,121 1,594 1.0250 0.7688 0.9921 1.0169 25.00 0.9827 1.0000 25.00 1.0169
2017 38,106 1,424 1,151 1,637 1.0250 0.7744 0.9936 1.0185 25.46 0.9890 1.0000 25.46 1.0185
2018 38,184 1,467 1,186 1,682 1.0260 0.7792 0.9928 1.0186 25.94 0.9971 1.0000 25.94 1.0186
2019 37,832 1,496 1,209 1,731 1.0275 0.7932 0.9937 1.0211 26.48 1.0039 1.0039 26.59 1.0250
2020 37,685 1,535 1,241 1,783 1.0285 0.8033 0.9824 1.0104 26.86 1.0184 1.0184 27.36 1.0290
2021 37,452 1,571 1,270 1,837 1.0295 0.8157 0.9875 1.0166 27.81 1.0132 1.0132 28.18 1.0300
2022 37,173 1,606 1,298 1,892 1.0300 0.8299 0.9848 1.0143 28.58 1.0155 1.0155 29.02 1.0300
2023 36,962 1,645 1,330 1,948 1.0300 0.8433 0.9828 1.0123 29.38 1.0174 1.0174 29.89 1.0300
2024 36,744 1,684 1,361 2,007 1.0300 0.8576 0.9841 1.0136 30.30 1.0162 1.0162 30.79 1.0300
2025 36,448 1,721 1,391 2,067 1.0300 0.8742 0.9834 1.0129 31.19 1.0169 1.0169 31.71 1.0300  
Comments: 
(1) Transformed values of (equivalent) contributors for 2011-2025 according to BMAS 2011, p. 56; transformations on the basis of the actual value for the actual 
work force in 2010 
(2) Calculation as product out of (1) and average gross wages according to BMAS 2011, p. 48 
(3) Normalized values of (2) on the basis of the relative change of actual gross wages in 2010 and in 2009 
(4) 0.65 times the corresponding values of (3) (as an empirically meaningful share of gross wages) and divided by (1) and by 12 (to obtain a per-month value) 
(5) See “square root’s” factor in Equation (1) 
(6) Transformed values of (equivalent) relations for 2011-2025 according to BMAS 2011, p. 56; transformations on the basis of the actual value for the relevant 
actual ratio in 2010 
(7) See “pensioners’ factor” in Equation (1) 
(8)-(13): See Equation (1) 
Source: Present author’s own calculations on the basis on the references mentioned among “comments” 
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Table A.4: Ex-ante values for contribution rates’ and “actual” pension adjustments’ elements, Germany 2011-2025 
Year
(1)
Total 
revenue 
 (in 106 €)
(2)
Contributions
(in 106 €)
(3)
Gross‐wage basis
for contributions
(in 106 €)
(4) 
Other 
revenues
(in 106 €)
(5)
Total 
expenditures
(in 106 €)
(6)
Pensions 
expenditures
(in 106 €)
(7)
Other 
expenditures
(in 106 €)
(8)
Contribution 
rate, 
calculated
(9)
"Actual" 
contribution 
rate
(10)
"Actual" 
adjustment 
rate
2011 249,100 184,334 926,302 64,766 244,700 220,230 24,470 0.194 0.199 0.9663
2012 252,400 186,776 952,939 65,624 249,800 224,820 24,980 0.193 0.196 1.0049
2013 254,400 188,256 980,500 66,144 254,200 228,780 25,420 0.192 0.192 1.0017
2014 258,100 190,994 1,005,232 67,106 258,100 232,290 25,810 0.190 0.190 0.9995
2015 264,800 195,952 1,031,326 68,848 265,900 239,310 26,590 0.191 0.190 1.0141
2016 271,500 200,910 1,057,421 70,590 274,400 246,960 27,440 0.193 0.190 1.0158
2017 278,100 205,794 1,083,126 72,306 282,800 254,520 28,280 0.194 0.190 1.0145
2018 285,300 211,122 1,111,168 74,178 292,400 263,160 29,240 0.196 0.190 1.0178
2019 294,300 217,782 1,140,220 76,518 303,400 273,060 30,340 0.199 0.191 1.0214
2020 313,800 232,212 1,166,894 81,588 314,600 283,140 31,460 0.200 0.199 1.0207
2021 323,900 239,686 1,198,430 84,214 324,700 292,230 32,470 0.201 0.200 1.0160
2022 335,800 248,492 1,230,158 87,308 335,700 302,130 33,570 0.202 0.202 1.0177
2023 346,400 256,336 1,262,739 90,064 348,200 313,380 34,820 0.204 0.203 1.0210
2024 360,400 266,696 1,294,641 93,704 361,200 325,080 36,120 0.207 0.206 1.0211
2025 374,300 276,982 1,325,273 97,318 373,900 336,510 37,390 0.209 0.209 1.0190  
Comments: 
(1), (5) See BMAS 2011, p. 40 (variant of mean employment’s development) 
(2) 0.74 times the corresponding values of (1) (0.74 as an empirically meaningful share of contributions) 
(3) Values of (2) divided by values of (9) 
(4) Difference between values of (1) and values of (3) 
(6) 0.90 times the corresponding values of (5) (0.90 as an empirically meaningful share of pension expenditures) 
(7) Difference between values of (5) and values of (6) 
(8) Calculated on the basis of Equation (2) 
(9) See BMAS 2011, p. 38 
(10) Calculated out of the value changes of (6) 
Source: Present author’s own calculations on the basis on the references mentioned among “comments” 
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Table A.5: Adjustment rates and differences in contribution rates 
                 according to “actual” adjustments and to IGWA, Germany 2011-2025 
Year
(1)
"Actual" 
adjustment 
rate
(2)
IGWA 
adjustment 
rate
(3)
Relation 
"IGWA / 
actual"
(4)
Difference of 
contribution rates 
according to "actual" 
adjustments and IGWA
2011 0.9663 1.0110 1.0463 0.0110
2012 1.0049 1.0264 1.0215 0.0051
2013 1.0017 0.9847 0.9830 ‐0.0040
2014 0.9995 0.9869 0.9874 ‐0.0029
2015 1.0141 1.0392 1.0247 0.0057
2016 1.0158 1.0169 1.0011 0.0003
2017 1.0145 1.0185 1.0040 0.0009
2018 1.0178 1.0186 1.0008 0.0002
2019 1.0214 1.0250 1.0036 0.0009
2020 1.0207 1.0290 1.0081 0.0020
2021 1.0160 1.0300 1.0138 0.0034
2022 1.0177 1.0300 1.0121 0.0030
2023 1.0210 1.0300 1.0088 0.0022
2024 1.0211 1.0300 1.0087 0.0022
2025 1.0190 1.0300 1.0108 0.0028  
Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
Table A.6: Estimated equations (OLS) in the context of well-being relationsa) 
                  on the basis of SOEP data for (western) Germany 1983-2009 
Dependent variable Until 29 years 30-59 years 60 years and older 
Share of labour income 
related to gross income 
-0.0037 t*** + 0.9029*** 
(R2 = 0.8961) 
-0.0022 t*** + 0.8950*** 
(R2 = 0.7664) 
0.0002 t2*** – 0.0059 t***
+ 0.2703*** 
(R2 = 0.4980) 
Share of capital income 
related to gross income 
0.0009 t*** + 0.0608*** 
(R2 = 0.8774) 
0.0009 t*** + 0.0442*** 
(R2 = 0.6859) 
0.0026 t*** +0.0932*** 
(R2 = 0.8964) 
Share of transfer in-
come related to gross 
income 
0.0029 t*** + 0.0680*** 
(R2 = 0.8774) 
0.0013 t*** + 0.0609*** 
(R2 = 0.6808) 
0.0002 t2*** – 0.0023 t 
+ 0.6412*** 
(R2 = 0.6886) 
Share of net income 
related to gross income 
-0.0001 t2** – 0.0022 t**
+ 0.7351*** 
(R2 = 0.2514) 
-0.0006 t** +0.7108*** 
(R2 = 0.1758) 
-0.0001 t2*** +0.0019 t**
+ 0.8933***   
(R2 = 0.2974) 
Labour income 300.17 t*** + 12,901*** 
(R2 = 0.9394) 
529.45 t*** + 14,710*** 
(R2 = 0.9788) 
131.04 t*** + 2,536.7***
(R2 = 0.9061) 
Capital income 37.79 t*** + 471.84*** 
(R2 = 0.9144) 
60.13 t*** + 670.98*** 
(R2 = 0.9187) 
119.14 t*** + 802.46*** 
(R2 = 0.9673) 
Transfer income 103.48 t*** + 675.05*** 
(R2 = 0.9584) 
85.48 t*** + 882.54*** 
(R2 = 0.9344) 
312.37 t*** + 7,211.6***
(R2 = 0.9814) 
Comments: 
a) Population shares of the three age groups according to the 12th consolidated population’s forecast of 
the German Statistical Office; t = time period – 1983; R2 = determination coefficient; all incomes are 
equivalent incomes (scaled-up by the modified OECD scale); gross income:= labour income + capital 
income + transfer income; net income:= net income’s share (estimated) multiplied by gross income 
(calculated); *** = statistically significant at the 1-percent level; ** = statistically significant at the 5-
percent level 
Source: Present author’s own calculations 
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